First, a round up of some current issues: Putin heading to China, two governors out (and two men with Ukraine war connections in), party politics and the jostling for second place, and how the Council of Europe is implicitly encouraging Putin to stay in power until he dies...

In the second half, the opening episode of a series of alternative history (the rest will be available to paying Patrons) exploring some of the great what-ifs. This time, what if Kyiv had surrendered to the Mongols in 1240 and never lost its pre-eminence? Following that single fork in the road leads to a different centre of gravity, different institutions, and maybe even a world where “Ukraine” never emerges in the way we know it.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

Support the show

No tanks, great camera work. Victory Day is supposed to be Russia’s most unshakeable story, the moment when the state proves its strength, its allies, and its confidence on Red Square. Yet watching this year’s parade, I can’t escape the sense that the symbolism is working harder than the reality: fewer troops, no heavy hardware in Moscow, and security concerns hanging over the whole performance.

In the rest of the podcast, I look at a leaked report on spinning peace and wonder if it part of an attempt to lobby Putin indirectly, the appointment of a new commander of Aerospace Forces, Colonel General Chaiko, and that (to me, pretty dodgy) 'European intelligence report' that has caused such a storm.

The bigger point is simple and uncomfortable: disinformation and psychological warfare are part of how this conflict is fought, and they thrive on our appetite for certainty.

The Kyiv Independent report I mentioned is here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

Support the show

A battlefield setback in Mali sparks a much bigger question: what kind of power is Russia now, and what kind of power can it afford to be? Is it a superpower? No. Is it a great power? It depends what you mean. It certainly is not just the "gas station with nukes" of the cliche.

Putin’s language of “sovereign civilisation” recasts greatness as resistance rather than dominance, especially as Victory Day messaging leans on endurance. I argue Russia is a middle power that can pivot, triangulate and sometimes punch above its weight without shaping the world order.

That's no bad thing. Russia (and Putin) are not "failures" as some would suggest, even if they have by no means hit their grand, aspirational goals. Russia would be a lot happier if it accepted this status but for Putin and his Homo Sovieticus peers, alas, this is not enough - and that is what has lead us all to the present unhappy place.

The article I mentioned from The i Paper is here, and the Deutsche Welle video is here.

The podcast's corporate partner and sponsor is Conducttr, which provides software for innovative and immersive crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, civil affairs and similar situations.

You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here.

Support the show