『The R&D Metric Mark Hurd and HP Got Wrong』のカバーアート

The R&D Metric Mark Hurd and HP Got Wrong

The R&D Metric Mark Hurd and HP Got Wrong

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概要

 Twenty years. Nearly one thousand episodes on this show. And starting today, we're going to try something a little different this season. Season 21 is about the decisions that actually determine whether innovation lives or dies inside any organization. The real calls. Not the fluff stuff we read in academic textbooks. I want to actually put you in the rooms where these decisions are happening. What went right. What went wrong. My objective is to expose you to the patterns in innovation decisions so that you can recognize them. Recognize them in yourself, in the people you need to influence, long before you step into any landmines. So let's get into it. The Encounter on the Top Floor of Building 25 Making generational decisions on innovation investment can be a make-or-break moment. What I refer to as a CLM, a Career Limiting Move. In my case, it started with a chance conversation with Mark Hurd, HP's CEO. Let me take you back to 2005. HP headquarters is on Page Mill Road in Palo Alto, referred to internally as Building 25. The top floor is where all of the executive offices are. That's where Mark's office was. I was up there doing some meetings and got snagged by Mark. Now, Mark had a reputation. He was a big numbers guy. He believed in what he called extreme benchmarking. You tore into your competitors' numbers. You knew your own numbers in and out.1 Others had warned me about this. He had a famous quote that everybody shared: "Stare at the numbers long enough, and they will eventually confess." Mark believed you could not lead a critical role at HP if you did not know your numbers cold, inside and out. Didn't matter whether it was sales, CTO, a function, or a division. It didn't matter. And Mark tested everyone on the leadership team. Not just the leadership team. He would randomly stop employees and ask them for their numbers based on what group they worked in. It was non-stop. It was constant. To where support staff was literally constantly preparing briefing books for managers, VPs, leaders, just in case they got nabbed by Mark. In my case, I happened to be walking past his office. Mark waved me in. I sat down, and he immediately started drilling me on the CTO numbers. The number he focused on was R&D as a percentage of revenue. The Broken Benchmark: R&D as a Percentage of Revenue Now, if you've been a regular listener of this show, you know my opinion of that metric. R&D as a percentage of revenue is a meaningless number.2 It is absolutely meaningless. But every public company CEO at an innovation-dependent company, all the tech companies, AI companies, even automotive, they live by this number. It's a number that Wall Street looks at. You have to report it as part of your quarterlies, and from there it's simple math.3 When Mark grilled me, he was focused specifically on the PC group at HP. HP's number at the time for the PC group was about one and a half percent. R&D as a percentage of the PC group's revenue. Acer, which was a key competitor, was at 0.8%. Less than one percent. Roughly half of HP's number.4 Apple was at four percent.5 Mark's question, and he was really pounding on this, was: How do we get our ratios in line with Acer? Basically, he was saying: how do we cut costs so that our R&D expense as a percentage of revenue equals Acer at 0.8%? This is exactly the problem with choosing the wrong metric. Now I'm going to quote somebody who I think was probably one of the most insightful leaders in the business world. Charlie Munger. If you've ever watched any of his talks, he had a really strong opinion on certain metrics. Specifically EBITDA, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Charlie referred to EBITDA as BS earnings. It was a metric Wall Street swore by, and Munger said it hid more than it revealed. His exact words: "Every time you see the word EBITDA, just substitute the word 'bullshit' earnings."6 R&D as a percentage of revenue is the same problem in a different disguise. It's the metric that makes every company look like it's investing when all it's doing is spending. Mark was using a broken instrument to make a generational decision. If you make decisions based on R&D as a percentage of revenue, and then you do comparisons like "let's make our numbers look like Acer," what you are actually deciding to do is cut your R&D. That is generational. You will destroy a company's innovation capability over the next ten to twenty years before you can even have a hope of rebuilding it.7 "We Are Not Apple and We Never Will Be" I looked at him and said: Why aren't we raising our R&D spend to match Apple? Mark didn't hesitate. He said: "We are not Apple and we never will be." I took offense at that. I was offended that he wouldn't even contemplate it. And I pushed back. I pushed back hard. I argued we could be Apple in areas where we had genuine advantage. Here's one example. Go back to September 2004, about a year before my meeting with Mark. Carly Fiorina was still...
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